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nation function as co-determinants of public 
attitudes. We focus on the political orientations 
of supporters of the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). We expect 
that Kemalist nationalism but not Islamist 
attachments dominate the considerations of 
these voters in line with their party’s positions. 
We uncover significant evidence of Islamist 
considerations in their evaluation of political 
issues indicating that Islamist and nationalistic 
considerations co-shape citizens’ attitudes. 
Key Words
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Introduction 
Historically, Islamism and Kemalist 
secular nationalism have been the main 
competitors in the socio-political mosaic 
of Turkey. Until recently, studies of 
Turkish politics used the dichotomy of 
Islamism versus secularism to understand 
public opinion.1 In their 2006 study, 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak empirically 
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Historically, several studies have 
identified the conflictual relationship 
between secularisation and the 
struggle for the preservation of Islamic 
authenticity that led to the polarisation 
of public opinion in Turkey.6 Recently, 
Çarkoğlu has shown that the change 
in the ideological base of parties taking 
place in Turkey has an impact on 
public opinion.7 Taniyici also provides 
evidence that the directional change of 
the ideological rhetoric as articulated 
by the pro-Islamist elite has led to the 
transformation of its main principles 
promoted by its party advocators.8 This 
has had a direct effect on the electoral 
basis of the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) 
as examined by Taniyici. In addition, 
Başlevent examines the effects of this 
change on the political behaviour of AKP 
party supporters: the positive positioning 
of the AKP towards EU membership 
coincided with an increase in the electoral 
support of the party, bringing to the 
electoral base new supporters belonging 
to the liberal segments of society.9 
The above studies set the discussion 
on these new developments in Turkish 
politics, and point to potential avenues 
for the exploration of interesting new 
trends in aggregate public opinion. 
But because the focus of these studies 
remains at the aggregate level, they 
cannot shed light on the determinants 
of citizens’ considerations as they make 
demonstrate that the boundaries 
between Islamism and secularism have 
become more fluid in recent years.2 
About a quarter of the participants in 
their study found it difficult to place 
themselves in either side of the Islamism 
vs. secularism scale, and instead opted for 
the middle ground.3 This suggests that 
for a large proportion of the population 
the cleavage between Islamism and 
secularism is no longer meaningful.4 
If the boundaries of the two ideologies 
have become blurred, perhaps the public 
adopts in their consideration of political 
issues elements of each ideology that are 
in agreement with their own values and 
principles. 
Our study extends this debate by 
examining the degree to which citizens 
use the main components of these 
ideologies in their everyday political 
preferences. We focus on attachment to 
Islam as the main principle of Islamism, 
and attachment to the nation as the main 
principle of Kemalism, and measure their 
impact on four sets of political attitudes: 
confidence towards political institutions, 
religiosity and faith, Turkish identity and 
citizenship, and modernisation. Is the 
influence of attachments to Islam and the 
nation polarising, or are citizens driven 
towards a reconciliatory type of political 
attitudes? We argue that Turkish citizens 
do not experience attachment to Islam 
and nationalism as antithetical; instead 
both considerations co-shape their issue 
preferences and political behaviours.5
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focus on electoral outcomes, and together 
they allow for a more substantive study 
of public opinion in Turkey. 
Our study complements research that 
examines the transformation of the 
political agenda of the main political 
parties in Turkey, originally documented 
by Çarkoğlu.11 Our focus, however, is 
not at the party or elite level, but on the 
determinants of citizens’ attitudes, and in 
particular the preferences of supporters 
of the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Our 
analysis explores whether the emergence 
and development of 
the AKP’s agenda 
has had an effect on 
CHP supporters, 
since this party is 
the main social and 
political opponent of 
the AKP. Although 
the agendas of the 
two political parties have fundamental 
differences, we are interested in their 
shared influences on individual political 
attitudes.12 We measure the extent to 
which attachments to the nation are 
complemented by attachments to Islam 
as they shape considerations for CHP 
supporters. If Islamism and Kemalist 
secularism populate opposite ends of 
the ideological continuum in Turkey, 
we should not see the influence of 
Islamist considerations on the opinions 
of voters that are traditionally driven 
their political choices. In our study, we 
address this gap by adopting a political 
psychology approach. Studies in political 
psychology often show that examining 
what drives the political preferences of 
individuals can uncover relationships 
between ideological inclinations that 
political science models often consider 
antithetical.10 Instead of just looking 
at the outcome of political preferences, 
a political psychology approach takes 
into account the antecedents, motives, 
considerations, values, and emotions 
that citizens employ when thinking and 
making decisions 
about politics. 
Political psychology 
studies focus on 
the determinants of 
political judgments, 
and seek to identify 
the cognitive and 
affective map by 
which citizens make 
political choices. In our article we 
examine the role of citizens’ attitudes 
towards Islam and the nation, in order 
to understand how Turkish citizens reach 
their judgements on significant issues. 
Our aim is not to quantify aggregate 
public opinion, but to understand 
how citizens arrive at their opinions by 
internalising the two political ideologies 
that dominate the Turkish political 
arena. This individual-level approach is 
complementary to aggregate studies that 
The “sacrifice” of the 
domination of religion is the 
price that Turkey has had to 
pay in order to move towards a 
modern nation-state according 
to the Western pattern.
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The Turkish Paradigm 
of the Clash of Kemalist 
Nationalism and Islamism
To understand the complex contextual 
framework which affects citizens’ 
ideological and issue preferences, 
and consequently the nature of the 
dynamic relationship between Kemalist 
nationalism and Islamism in Turkey, here 
we provide a brief overview of the debates 
around the issues of religiosity, attitudes 
towards the state, and modernisation, 
which we examine in detail in our 
empirical section.
Kemalist Nationalism, 
Secularisation, and Islamism
The socio-political evolution that is 
taking place in Turkey today is deeply 
rooted in the two ideological principles 
of Kemalist secularism and nationalism.13 
The Kemalist ideology with these 
two pillars aimed at the creation of a 
new republican state by promoting 
the homogenisation of society.14 The 
influence of Islam on politics, economics, 
education and culture was seen as 
the most important barrier towards 
modernisation.15 For nationalists, 
religion is a private issue and the 
politicisation of religion is undesirable. 
The “sacrifice” of the domination of 
religion is the price that Turkey has 
had to pay in order to move towards a 
by nationalist considerations. If, on the 
other hand, attachments to the nation 
share a space with attachments to Islam 
in citizens’ opinions, this is preliminary 
evidence of the interaction of the two 
ideologies in citizens’ judgments. This is 
the puzzle that our article addresses and 
explains. 
The contribution of our work is three-
fold. First, we engage with scholars that 
examine the dynamic development of 
public opinion in Turkey by offering 
evidence at the individual level. Our 
political psychology approach focuses on 
individual opinions to show how they 
internalise components of the dominant 
ideological orientations. Rather 
than looking at aggregate trends and 
predicting electoral behaviour, we are 
interested in identifying the determinants 
of citizens’ opinions. Second, we address 
the debate on the tension between 
Islamism and Kemalist secularism by 
offering new evidence of the presence 
of Islamist considerations in the issue 
preferences of CHP voters. We argue 
that attachments to Islam and the nation 
are intertwined, rather than polarising, 
pillars of Turkish public opinion, and 
urge for further investigation of their 
complex relationship. Lastly, this 
study expands current public opinion 
models developed in the West to study 
societies that function within a different 
framework and historical background, 
tradition and political context. 
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military, social and economic rights as 
well as several judicial reforms. Can we 
identify any effects of the directional 
change that took place in recent years in 
the narratives of the political advocates 
of Islamism and secular Kemalism 
on citizens’ political attitudes? To 
answer this, we need to look into how 
attachments to Islam and the nation, 
the characteristic elements of Islamism 
and Kemalism secular nationalism 
respectively, have been internalised by 
Turkish citizens in the current political 
climate.
A number of studies have examined 
the development of political Islam 
and the nature and role of the AKP in 
Turkish politics.20 However, there is a 
lack of studies examining the impact 
of the transformation of political Islam 
on CHP supporters. We argue that 
if the transformation of the AKP has 
had an effect on the societal basis of 
Turkish society, this effect might also be 
evident in the political preferences of the 
supporters of the CHP regarding major 
debates such as support for political 
institutions, religiosity, national identity 
and modernisation.
modern nation-state according to the 
Western pattern.16 Therefore, national 
identity is predominantly Turkish, while 
the Turkish state is the agent that has to 
be obeyed. 
Islamism grew in opposition to the 
nationalist view of modernisation 
promoted by Kemalism, and it saw 
modernisation as a threat against 
authenticity and traditional values and 
principles. Islamists developed a sense of 
obedience towards the state to the extent 
that it promotes and respects the Islamic 
values and principles.17 For Islamists, 
national identity is primarily Islamic and 
is related to the values and principles of 
the Turkish nation.18 According to this 
belief, religion can appear in both the 
public and private spheres of the nation-
state. 
These differences have been the basis 
for the argument that Islamism and 
secularisation are at opposite ends of 
the same continuum. How do Turkish 
citizens negotiate this relationship? Do 
they internalise this conflict, adopting 
only one or the other ideology? After the 
AKP’s electoral win in 2002, the CHP 
has been using the threat against the 
Kemalist basis of the republic as a way 
to delegitimise parties with explicit or 
implicit connections with the Islamic 
movement.19 But the 2010 AKP win in 
the referendum regarding constitutional 
reforms opened the path for significant 
transformations on the role of the 
When it comes to issues 
involving religion, the discourse 
of the dominant political parties 
was traditionally oppositional. 
Tereza Capelos & Stavroula Chrona
56
elements have been shown to recently 
share influence in determining public 
attitudes. 
When it comes to issues involving 
religion, the discourse of the dominant 
political parties was traditionally 
oppositional. The CHP and its Kemalist 
state proponents have promoted the 
complete control of religion by the state 
and the subsequent marginalisation 
of religion in the private sphere. The 
AKP’s agenda combines religion with 
the secular values of Turkey. Namely, it 
has supported secularism in line with 
democratic values and freedom rights, 
with religion working as a social value. 
Unlike the traditional Islamic parties, 
the AKP has not pursued Islamic policies 
with the aim to transform the state and 
society under the rule of religion. It has, 
however, promoted Islamic ethics and 
ways of life in terms of religious values 
and principles.21 For all citizens, religious 
considerations should be positively 
associated with Islamist attachments, so 
that high levels of Islamist attachment 
would predict high levels of religiosity. 
However, when we examine the 
The Determinants of 
Institutional Support, Religiosity, 
National Identity, and 
Modernisation 
When citizens evaluate political 
institutions and organisations, they often 
identify them as entities that represent 
the boundaries of particular ideologies. 
We therefore expect that Islamist and 
nationalistic attachments should be 
clearly differentiated when it comes 
to attitudes towards state-based and 
international institutions. Nationalistic 
attachments should generate a critical 
stance towards an AKP-led state, in line 
with Kemalist principles, and confidence 
in the military and the courts as the 
traditional protectors of the Kemalist 
inheritance. Islamist attachments should 
predict favourable attitudes towards the 
state as well as towards the parliament 
where the AKP holds the majority of the 
seats, and also high confidence towards 
religious leaders. 
There are however other areas of 
Turkish politics where the influences of 
nationalistic and Islamist attachments 
might not be as clearly marked: 
religiosity, where attachments to Islam 
traditionally dominated the debate but 
have recently become less rigid; Turkish 
identity, where the role of nationalistic 
attachments traditionally defined 
political perceptions but have been more 
relaxed; and modernisation where both 
Unlike the traditional Islamic 
parties, the AKP has not pursued 
Islamic policies with the aim to 
transform the state and society 
under the rule of religion. 
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incorporates local and traditional values 
and principles as well as the universal 
trends of conservatism.25 For that 
matter, if the AKP’s agenda is successful 
in reaching the Turkish public, there 
should be evidence of the influence of 
Islamist attachments on the attitudes 
towards Turkish identity even among 
CHP voters. 
When we consider issues such as 
the preservation of “Turkishness” 
a discussion of tolerance of ethnic 
diversity and minority rights is inevitable. 
Kemalism has historically stood against 
any form of compromise with minority 
populations; therefore, nationalistic 
attachments should highlight negative 
attitudes towards minorities. Islamism 
on the other hand promotes support 
of cultural rights of minorities on the 
basis of their shared Islamic identity. 
Islamist attachments therefore should 
be associated with a tolerance towards 
minorities. 
How citizens perceive Turkey’s future 
is expected to be influenced by both 
Islamist and nationalistic considerations. 
As we saw earlier, Kemalist nationalism 
was the advocate of modernisation in 
the early days of the republic, promoting 
religiosity of CHP supporters, a group 
that has traditionally been influenced 
by the Kemalist nationalist agenda that 
was oppositional to religion, we would 
expect nationalistic attachments to have 
a negative effect on the endorsement of 
the influence of religion in public life. 
This is in line with the CHP’s agenda 
that promotes the marginalisation of 
religion into the private sphere under 
the complete control of the state. We 
expect to find that secular principles 
are associated with high levels of 
nationalistic attachments which oppose 
the domination of religion in public life. 
Turning to issues of Turkish identity, 
we expect attachments to the nation 
to dominate citizens’ orientations, 
particularly to supporters of the CHP. The 
CHP retains the party’s strong historical 
orientation towards nationalism and 
secularism while also following the 
Kemalist inheritance of a state-controlled 
economy.22 The Kemalist version of 
nationalism has always been hostile to 
the politicisation of any other identity 
besides the state and the nation.23 For 
the AKP, national identity is Islamic 
and modern; 24 traditional values and 
principles go hand in hand with the 
universalist perspective combined with 
the local. This rationalism does not 
ignore the religious understanding of 
life. The “new Turkish citizen” is subject 
to this mixture of Islamic authenticity 
and liberal transformation. As Erdoğan 
stated, the AKP supports a system that 
The “new Turkish citizen” 
is subject to this mixture of 
Islamic authenticity and liberal 
transformation. 
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Table 1: Issue Orientations of Kemalist Nationalism and Islamism
Kemalist nationalism Islamism
Confidence towards 
institutions
Confidence towards the judicial system 
(courts) and military.
(positive influence)
Confidence towards the parliament, 
police and religious leaders.
(positive influence)
Religiosity Low importance of religion in public 
life. Religion is a private matter, which 
lies away from the political spectrum.
(negative influence)
High importance of religion. Religion 
has a social value that cannot be 
overwhelmed by modernisation 
processes.
(positive influence)
Turkish identity Emphasis on the secular state
(positive influence)
Emphasis on traditional values and 
principles.
(positive influence)
Ethnic diversity and 
minority rights
Against any form of compromising 
with minority demands. Defend 
Turkish national unity.
(negative influence)
Support towards Islamic-defined unity 
of the nation. Support cultural rights of 
Muslim minorities.
(positive influence)
Attitudes towards 
the state 
Respect towards the secular basis of 
state and Kemalist principles.
(negative influence)
Respect towards the current 
government and the state.
(positive influence)
Modernisation Agreement in line with the Kemalist 
inheritance. 
(positive influence)
Conservative modernisation in line 
with the Turkish and Islamic values and 
traditions.
(positive influence)
are its principle aims to lead the 
country towards the EU accession with 
a movement of “Muslim democrats” 
in which Islam provides a cultural 
background.28 So when it comes to 
attitudes towards internationalisation 
and modernisation, we expect attachment 
to Islam and the nation to share 
influence at the individual level among 
CHP supporters. Our expectations are 
presented in Table 1. 
the transformation of the country into 
a modern and secular nation state. 
“Turkishness” and the affiliation with 
the Turkish nation-state were viewed as 
the mandatory characteristics of modern 
citizenry.26 Today the AKP and its 
conservative liberal democratic rhetoric 
is a proponent of Turkey’s modernisation 
and Europeanisation project.27 Clear 
testaments of the influence of AKP to 
notions of modernisation and progress 
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To summarise, here we examined 
the conditions under which Islamist 
and nationalistic attachments share 
the Turkish political and societal space 
and apply parallel influence on citizens’ 
considerations. Existing public opinion 
and political behaviour studies in 
Turkey mainly provide an analysis of 
the social and political cleavages that 
formulate the volatile and fragmented 
basis of the Turkish electoral body 
focusing particularly on their impact on 
voting behaviour and party preferences. 
The main dimensions examined in 
the literature are the centre-periphery 
cleavage, the left-right dichotomy, and 
Islamism against Kemalist secularism. 29 
Other studies have looked at the effects of 
religiosity, the early formation of political 
inclinations, as well as identity, education, 
and economic considerations.30 These 
investigations are important as they set 
the stage for understanding how citizens 
reach their judgments, providing the 
basic explanatory models of voting 
behaviour and party preference. Our 
study asks whether attachments to the 
nation and Islam should be considered as 
antithetical forces or as co-determinants 
of voters’ political preferences. 
Research Methodology and 
Data Collection
Existing public opinion surveys do 
not contain measures that would allow 
us to test our hypotheses, and aggregate 
polling data do not allow for individual-
level analyses.31 To overcome these 
shortcomings, we collected survey data 
in August 2009 using self-administered 
questionnaires which contained 
measures of attachment to the nation 
and to Islam and political preferences on 
several indicators of religiosity, national 
identity and modernisation. The survey 
recorded the opinions of 107 Turkish 
citizens living in Ankara.32
Survey Location and Sample 
Characteristics
Based on its electoral returns, the 
Ankara province appears to be an AKP 
stronghold.33 Since 2002, the electoral 
returns for the AKP in the country’s 
capital have been significantly increasing, 
and are higher than the electoral returns 
of the CHP. In contrast, other major 
cities have a lower percentage of AKP 
voters and a higher percentage of CHP 
voters. We administered our survey 
in Ankara, expecting that the strong 
electoral position of the AKP would 
generate high levels of polarisation 
among CHP and AKP supporters, 
putting to test the influences of Islamist 
attachments on their orientations. A 
second scenario is also plausible: that the 
high support that the AKP receives in 
this province might make the influence 
of the AKP’s ideological orientations 
such as attachment to Islam more evident 
in the political preferences of CHP 
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to which participants felt part of 
the Islamic world and attachment 
to the nation by the extent to which 
they felt part of the Turkish nation.36 
These two variables captured the main 
characteristics of Islamism and Kemalist 
secular nationalism. To identify CHP 
supporters, we asked which party 
participants voted for in the last elections. 
About 67 participants reported voting 
for CHP and they are the ones we label 
CHP supporters in the analyses that 
follow. 
Our survey also contained measures 
of our dependent variables: confidence 
towards political actors and institutions, 
political attitudes on religiosity and 
faith, national identity, tolerance, 
respect for minorities, citizenship, and 
modernisation, which allowed us to test 
our expectation of the impact of Islamist 
considerations on a large number of 
significant political preferences. All 
employed measures used scales from 
0 to 10 to allow for easy comparisons 
across variables. We asked questions 
regarding confidence towards different 
supporters. In our study, about 73% of 
our participants are CHP voters and the 
main analyses that follow are conducted 
only on these participants. 
Turkey’s population is heterogeneous 
in terms of the determinants of political 
orientations such as in ideological levels, 
religiosity strength and traditionalism.34 
We used a large number of initial 
contacts and tried to ensure that the 
participants for our study came from 
different socio-political backgrounds. 
Because we are interested in identifying 
the considerations of voters as they 
reach their political preferences, rather 
than putting forth arguments about 
the political orientations of the average 
Turkish citizen, or providing estimates 
of public opinion trends, it is not 
problematic for our study that the sample 
is not representative of the population. 
In essence, we are interested in tracing 
the process of decision making, rather 
than making claims about population 
averages. We do recognise, however, that 
generalising our results should be done 
with caution, keeping into account the 
characteristics of our sample (middle 
class, higher educated, mostly male 
participants, living in Ankara).35
Questionnaire and Measures
The survey contained measures of 
our two predictor variables, attachment 
to Islam and the nation. We measured 
Islamist attachments by the extent 
Participants were asked whether 
people should be tolerant 
of those who choose to live 
according to their own moral 
standards even if they are 
different from their own. 
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from Turkey, being born in Turkey, 
having adopted Turkey’s customs, and 
being a law-abiding citizen. Attitudes 
towards modernisation were measured 
by questions asking whether tradition 
and modern values should coexist, 
whether modern values are more 
important than tradition, and whether 
modern values should respect tradition. 
Finally, participants were asked whether 
they agreed with the statement that 
people should adjust their behaviour to 
the changing world.37 
Analyses and Findings
First, we examined levels of political 
confidence to get an understanding of 
how Islamist and national attachments 
can reflect attitudes towards political 
institutions. In examining the average 
confidence ratings of CHP supporters 
towards political institutions we noticed 
significant variability, reflecting the 
affiliations of CHP voters with particular 
political groups and institutions. As 
we see in Table 2, levels of confidence 
towards religious leaders, the parliament, 
political parties, the European Union 
(EU) and the United Nations (UN) were 
lower than 3 points on a 0 to 10 scale. 
On the other hand, the armed forces, 
the courts, and labour unions received 
higher scores of confidence from 5 to 6 
points on the same scale. 
political actors and organisations in 
order to determine whether attachments 
to the nation and Islam favour particular 
political groups. Here we expected 
clear differentiations on the basis of 
political ideology. Specifically we asked 
participants to indicate how much 
confidence they had towards religious 
leaders, the courts, labour unions, 
political parties, the parliament, police, 
the armed forces, the EU and the 
UN. To measure religiosity we asked 
participants whether they were religious, 
how important Allah was in their lives, 
and how important religion was for the 
country. To measure attitudes towards the 
state, respondents were asked to evaluate 
the importance of the country in having 
strong defence forces and maintaining a 
stable economy. To measure orientations 
towards ethnic diversity, we asked 
whether ethnic diversity enriches life. To 
measure attitudes towards the rights of 
minorities we asked whether participants 
would support granting cultural rights to 
minority populations. We also examined 
tolerance towards different groups in 
society. Participants were asked whether 
people should be tolerant of those who 
choose to live according to their own 
moral standards even if they are different 
from their own. We also measured 
opinions towards the perceptions of 
national identity by asking participants 
whether certain characteristics should 
be a requirement for the attainment of 
Turkish citizenship: having ancestors 
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Table 2: Average Scores on Political Attitudes of CHP Supporters
CHP supporters
mean (st. deviation)
Confidence: Religious leaders 1.9 (2.1)
Confidence: Parliament  2.3 (2.19)
Confidence: Political parties 2.3 (2.2)
Confidence: EU 2.5 (2.2)
Confidence: UN 2.8 (2.4)
Confidence: Labour unions 4.8 (2.3)
Confidence: Courts 5.4 (2.4)
Confidence: Armed forces 5.9 (2.6)
Importance: Allah in life 6.3 (2.8)
Importance: Religion in Turkey 7.7 (1.8)
Citizenship: Having Turkish ancestors 4.3 (3.3)
Citizenship: Being born on Turkish soil 4.3 (3.1)
Citizenship: Adopt customs 6.3 (2.6)
Citizenship: Abide laws 7.6 (2.4)
Agreement: State is sacred and must be loved and obeyed unconditionally 3.6 (3.1)
Importance: Being a world citizen 7.3 (2.5)
Importance: Giving people more to say in government decisions 8.9 (1.4)
Importance: Protecting freedom of speech 9.3 (1.2)
Importance: Having strong defence forces 7.1 (2.3)
Importance: Having strong economy  9.4 (.9)
Agreement: Ethnic diversity enriches life 8.6 (1.7)
Agreement: Giving cultural rights to minorities 8.6 (1.5)
Agreement: Tolerating different moral standards 9.1 (1.4)
Agreement: Newer lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society 4.7 (3.0)
Agreement: Modern values are more important than tradition 5.6 (2.5)
Agreement: People should adjust their behaviour to the changing world 6.3 (2.7)
Agreement: Modern values should respect traditions 6.7 (2.8)
Agreement: Modern values should coexist with tradition 8.6 (1.9)
Note: Values are means, standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with 
0 indicating lack of confidence, lack of importance, or lack of agreement, and 10 indicating very high 
confidence, a great deal of importance, or very strong agreement. 
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Because of the differentiation in 
the levels of confidence towards these 
political institutions, we examined the 
effects of attachments to the nation 
and Islam on attitudes towards each 
institution separately by running several 
regression analyses presented in Table 3. 
An interesting pattern becomes evident 
when we examine the significance of the 
regression coefficients: attachments to 
the nation predict confidence towards 
some institutions and attachments to 
Islam towards others, indicating that it 
is not just the nationalist orientations 
that shape CHP supporters’ levels of 
confidence. Islamist considerations 
also come to mind under specific 
circumstances and colour the judgments 
of CHP voters. Characteristically, we 
see that a unit increase in attachments 
to the nation among CHP supporters 
causes a .16 point increase in confidence 
towards the parliament, but a .47 point 
decline in confidence towards political 
parties. A unit increase in attachments 
to the nation also causes a .40 point 
decline in confidence towards the EU 
and a .34 point decline towards the UN. 
These numbers indicate that among 
CHP voters, attachments to the nation 
act mainly as moderators rather than 
stimulators of political confidence. 
The negative effects of nationalistic 
attachments on confidence towards the 
EU and the UN are more than double in 
size compared to their positive effect on 
confidence towards the parliament. 
At the same time we noticed the 
compensating impact of Islamist 
attachments on these evaluations. A 
unit increase in Islamist attachments 
among CHP voters causes a .13 point 
increase in confidence towards the EU 
and .18 point increase in confidence 
towards the UN. As attachments to 
Islam become more pronounced for 
these voters, confidence towards these 
international institutions is restored to 
a modest extent. The above effects show 
the shared but oppositional impact of the 
two ideologies on evaluations of political 
institutions. Islamist attachments appear 
also to affect CHP voters’ confidence on 
their own. A unit increase in Islamist 
attachments leads to a .14 point decline 
in confidence towards labour unions, 
and a .15 point decline in confidence 
towards the courts showing that when 
Islamist considerations become salient 
in the minds of CHP voters, they work 
against the overall favourable evaluations 
of these institutions. Interestingly 
however, this moderating impact of 
Islamic considerations by .15 points 
is less powerful than the moderating 
impact of nationalistic considerations by 
.40 or more points that we saw earlier. 
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Table 3: Confidence in Institutions
CHP supporters
Confidence in the parliament Constant .06 (1.54)
Attachment to Islam .19 (.07)
Attachment to the nation .16 ** (.17)
Adj R2 .09
N 67
Confidence in political parties Constant 6.04 *** (1.57)
Attachment to Islam .11 (.07)
Attachment to the nation -.47 ** (.17)
Adj R2 .10
N 67
Confidence in labour unions Constant 5.50 *** (1.64)
Attachment to Islam -.14+  (.07)
Attachment to the nation -.02 (.18)
Adj R2 .02
N 67
Confidence in courts Constant 5.38 ** (1.72)
Attachment to Islam -0.15+  (.08)
Attachment to the nation .07 (.19)
Adj R2 .03
N 67
Confidence in the EU Constant 5.57 *** (1.5)
Attachment to Islam .13+  (.07)
Attachment to the nation -.40 * (.17)
Adj R2 .09
N 67
Confidence in the UN Constant 5.17 ** (1.7)
Attachment to Islam .18 * (.08)
Attachment to the nation -.34+  (.18)
Adj R2 .09
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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Next, we examined areas where our 
theoretical discussion predicts that the 
influences of nationalistic and Islamist 
elements would not be clearly separated. 
First we examined religiosity. Here we 
expected that Islamist attachments would 
dominate the debate even among CHP 
voters. Nationalist attachments should 
be associated with the marginalisation 
of religion into the private sphere of life. 
We asked CHP voters to indicate the role 
of religion in their lives and the intensity 
of their religiosity. In Table 2 we saw that 
CHP voters scored an average of 6.3 on a 
scale of 0-10 when asked how important 
Allah was in their lives. They also scored 
7.7 on a similar scale when asked how 
important religion was for their country. 
In addition, when asked whether they 
get comfort and strength from religion, 
about 35% answered positively, and 
25% identified themselves as a religious 
person. This shows that religion is an 
important issue, and attitudes towards 
religion should be studied further. 
We proceeded to examine the degree 
to which attachments to the nation 
and Islam influence attitudes towards 
religion, and in particular perceptions 
of the importance of Allah in citizens’ 
lives. Our results from the regression 
analysis in Table 4 show the pronounced 
effect of Islamist attachments and the 
non-significant role of attachments to 
the nation. This was in line with our 
expectations: religiosity is an area where 
the Islamist ideology has ownership. A 
unit increase in Islamist attachments on 
a 0 to 10 scale increases perceptions of 
the importance of Allah in citizens’ lives 
by about .35 points among CHP voters. 
This indicates that when it comes to 
issues of religion, attachment to Islam 
has no party boundaries as it influences 
the opinions even of the supporters of the 
party that traditionally places secondary 
emphasis on religious considerations. 
Table 4: Attitudes Towards Religion
CHP supporters
Allah important in life Constant 5.04 * (1.89)
Attachment to Islam .35 *** (.09)
Attachment to the nation -.02 (.21)
Adj R2 .18
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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The next area we tested involved 
perceptions of Turkish national 
identity. Here our expectation was that 
attachments to the nation should define 
support for national identity, particularly 
since we focus on CHP voters. However, 
elements of Turkish identity that have 
been promoted by Islamic voices, such 
as the preservation of Islamist values 
and principles, could be seen as relevant 
even by CHP voters. In other words, 
we expected a shared impact of the two 
ideologies, each focusing on different 
elements of the multifaceted concept 
of Turkish identity and citizenship. 
First, we asked CHP voters to identify 
the importance of having Turkish 
ancestors, being born on Turkish soil, 
adopting customs, and abiding by the 
laws of the state. The means reported 
in Table 2 show the preference of CHP 
voters for a law-oriented specification of 
citizenship with scores of 7.6 on a 0 to 
10 scale for abiding by the laws. Being 
born on Turkish soil and having Turkish 
ancestors received modest evaluations 
of 4.3 points while adopting customs 
scored somewhat higher with 6.3 points. 
We now turn to Table 5 which presents 
the regression results that identify the 
effects of attachments to Islam and the 
nation on these four components of 
Turkish citizenship. As we expected, 
attachments to Islam and the nation 
influence Turkish identity attitudes, 
but each affects different components 
of this complex consideration. Islamist 
attachments are significant predictors 
for seeing Turkish ancestry as important, 
being born in Turkey, and adopting 
customs. A unit increase in Islamist 
attachments leads to about a .20 point 
increase in these attitudes. On the other 
hand, attachments to the nation are 
a significant predictor of the opinion 
that following the law is what makes a 
good Turkish citizen. A unit increase in 
attachments to the nation, on a 0 to 10 
scale, leads to a .55 point increase in this 
opinion. To recap, both considerations 
influence different aspects of thinking 
about what constitutes the identity of 
the nation. While attachments to Islam 
promote perceptions of citizenship that 
highlight tradition, ancestry and customs, 
attachments to the nation prime more 
state-oriented notions of citizenship. 
Notably, when significant, the size of 
the effect of nationalistic attachments 
is more than double of that of Islamic 
attachments, pointing to the dominant 
role of nationalistic considerations in the 
way CHP voters make up their minds 
about Turkish citizenship. 
Elements of Turkish identity 
that have been promoted by 
Islamic voices, such as the 
preservation of Islamist values 
and principles, could be seen as 
relevant even by CHP voters.
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Table 5: Elements of National Identity
CHP supporters
Citizenship: having ancestors Constant 2.62 (2.36)
Attachment to Islam .23 * (.11)
Attachment to the nation .08 (.26)
Adj R2 .04
N 67
Citizenship: born on soil Constant 5.47 * (2.25)
Attachment to Islam .20 +  (.10)
Attachment to the nation -.23 (.25)
Adj R2 .04
N 67
Citizenship: adopt customs Constant 3.95 * (1.87)
Attachment to Islam .18 * (.09)
Attachment to the nation .18 (.20)
Adj R2 .05
N 67
Citizenship: abide by laws Constant 2.32 (1.62)
Attachment to Islam .10 (.07)
Attachment to the nation .55 ** (.18)
Adj R2 .16
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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Related to the idea of what constitutes 
a “true” Turkish citizen are attitudes 
towards the state, government and 
political participation. As we saw in Table 
2, CHP voters have strong preferences 
towards protecting free speech and giving 
people more say in government decisions, 
scoring on average around 9 points on 
0-10 scales. Here the opinions of CHP 
supporters appear to be homogeneous, 
as indicated by the high means and low 
standard deviations of these items. CHP 
voters also consider it important to be 
a world citizen, scoring on average 7.3 
points on a 0-10 scale. On the other 
hand, they do not place much emphasis 
on obedience towards the state. To the 
statement “the state is sacred; it must be 
loved and obeyed unconditionally” the 
mean response was only 3.6 points on a 
0-10 scale.
Table 6 presents the regression 
coefficients of national and Islamist 
attachments for each analysis. Here the 
effects of attachments to the nation and 
Islam depend on the attitude under 
consideration, and we can identify the 
shared influence of the two ideologies 
on these complex orientations of CHP 
supporters. First, we notice that here 
the opinions of CHP supporters were 
homogeneous; as in the case of giving 
people more say in governmental 
decisions, and protecting freedom of 
speech, any variability in responses 
is negatively predicted by Islamist 
attachments. A unit increase in Islamist 
attachments causes a .12 and .09 point 
decline in these attitudes, showing that 
tension can exist in the ideological 
orientations of CHP supporters. When 
attachments to Islam penetrate political 
preferences, they play a moderating 
role on otherwise strongly held political 
opinions. 
Islamist attachments are also 
statistically significant determinants of 
self-perceptions of being a world citizen. 
A unit increase in Islamist attachments 
causes a .15 point change. This finding 
is in line with the universalist approach 
followed by the AKP, but what is 
interesting here is that its influence 
holds even among CHP voters. We 
see that where opinions among CHP 
supporters are not strongly held, as with 
obedience towards the state, it is national 
attachments that appear to be a significant 
and positive predictor. A one unit 
increase in national attachments predicts 
a .61 point increase in obedience towards 
the state. The effect of nationalism again 
is in size three times larger compared to 
the effect of Islamic attachments, when 
the regression coefficients are significant. 
Nationalistic attachments are dominant 
and salient considerations in matters 
of obedience towards the state. The 
importance of giving people more say 
in government affairs and protecting 
freedom of speech is moderated by 
Islamic considerations, but only weakly. 
On these questions, the average responses 
of CHP voters show high favourability, 
evident in the high mean scores of these 
questions in Table 2. 
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Table 6: Attitudes Towards the State, the Government and Political Participation
CHP supporters
Obeying the state Constant -1.79 (2.23)
Attachment to Islam -.02 (.10)
Attachment to the nation .61 ** (.24)
Adj R2 .09
N 67
Giving people more say in 
government decisions Constant 9.95 *** (.95)
Attachment to Islam -.12 ** (.04)
Attachment to the nation -.06 (.10)
Adj R2 .09
N 67
Protecting freedom of speech Constant 10.02 ***  (.87)
Attachment to Islam -.09 * (.04)
Attachment to the nation -.04 (.09)
Adj R2 .05
N 67
See myself as world citizen Constant 3.80 * (1.79)
Attachment to Islam .15 +  (.08)
Attachment to the nation .32 (.20)
Adj R2 .06
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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A similar observation can be made 
regarding issues of national politics, 
where we see that different considerations 
are determined by Islamist and national 
attachments. We asked participants to 
rate the importance of making sure that 
Turkey has strong defence forces and 
maintains a stable economy as a matter of 
top priority for the country for the next 
10 years. Both questions were on 0-10 
scales where 0 was not at all important 
and 10 was very important. As we saw 
in Table 2, the economy was considered 
as very important, with a score of 9.4 
points out of 10, while on the issue of 
strong defence, CHP supporters on 
average gave a score of 7.1 points. 
Table 7 shows the results of the OLS 
regression analyses of attachments to 
Islam and the nation on the economy 
and defence. Attachments to Islam are a 
significant negative predictor of attitudes 
towards economic growth. A unit 
increase in Islamist attachments causes 
a .07 point decline in the importance of 
the economy. This is a modest negative 
effect and points to one more area where 
opinions among CHP voters showed 
homogeneity, and are moderated by 
Islamist considerations. This might 
be because since 2002 the economy 
has flourished under the watch of the 
AKP government, and thus Islamist 
considerations make the importance of 
the economy somewhat less salient in 
voters’ minds. Where opinions of CHP 
supporters had more variability, as in the 
case of the importance of defence forces, 
attachments to the nation and Islam 
had antithetical impact. A unit increase 
in Islamist attachments predicted a 
.13 point increase in the importance 
of strong defence forces while a unit 
change in attachments to the nation 
had a negative effect of .59 points. 
Again we notice that when significant, 
the effect of nationalistic attachments is 
much stronger than the effect of Islamic 
considerations. This is not a surprise since 
nationalistic attachments are more salient 
considerations for CHP voters than 
attachments to Islam. We see the mild 
positive effect of Islamist attachments as 
evidence that CHP supporters recognise 
the significance of defence forces in 
securing the country’s position in the 
neighbourhood but also in the European 
and global arena. The strong negative 
effect of attachments to the nation when 
it comes to defence forces might be due 
to memories of the past military coups 
and their negative implications for the 
public life and broader societal stability. 
We see the positive effect of 
nationalistic attachments as 
evidence of the influence of 
the Islamist considerations 
of recognition and tolerance 
towards minorities on the 
political ideology of CHP 
voters. 
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Table 7: Important Political Issues
CHP supporters
Strong defence forces Constant 11.89 *** (1.57)
Attachment to Islam .13 (.07)
Attachment to the nation -.59 *** (.17)
Adj R2 .16
N 67
Maintaining a stable economy Constant 8.89 *** (.67)
Attachment to Islam -.07 * (.03)
Attachment to the nation .09 (.07)
Adj R2 .07
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
A related set of attitudes involve 
citizens’ orientations towards other 
groups in society. In Table 2 we saw 
the average responses of CHP voters 
on issues of ethnic diversity, minorities, 
and tolerance. We asked whether ethnic 
diversity enriches life, and whether CHP 
voters approved of granting cultural 
rights to minorities and tolerating 
different moral standards. The average 
responses among CHP supporters 
showed high agreement with scores of 9.1 
and 8.6 on the 0-10 scale. In Table 8 we 
examine the ideological origins of these 
attitudes with a set of OLS regressions 
and found that attachment to the nation 
is the main determinant while Islamist 
considerations are non-significant. A 
unit increase in attachments to the nation 
increases agreement in allocating cultural 
rights to minorities by .40 points, and 
appreciation of ethnic diversity by .31 
points. Promoting tolerance for different 
moral standards also increases but at a 
slower rate of .24 points. These effect sizes 
follow the same trend of the impact of 
nationalistic considerations on political 
attitudes, they are however somewhat 
milder than the effects of nationalism 
we noticed in the previous tables. These 
results also might seem surprising given 
the traditionally hard Kemalist line 
towards minorities. We see the positive 
effect of nationalistic attachments 
as evidence of the influence of the 
Islamist considerations of recognition 
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and tolerance towards minorities on 
the political ideology of CHP voters. 
Earlier in our theoretical discussion, we 
talked about the potential impact of one 
ideology on the other over the recent 
decades. Although we were not able to 
test hypotheses regarding the over-time 
development and cross-influence of the 
two ideologies, we see this as a sign of 
the bridging of the tension between the 
nationalistic and Islamist approaches 
towards minorities. 
Table 8: Attitudes Towards Ethnic Diversity, Integration and Tolerance
CHP supporters
Ethnic diversity enriches life Constant 5.78 *** (1.19)
Attachment to Islam .00 (.05)
Attachment to the nation .31 * (.13)
Adj R2 .05
N 67
Cultural rights to minorities Constant 5.30 *** (1.00)
Attachment to Islam -.07 (.05)
Attachment to the nation .40 *** (.11)
Adj R2 .16
N 67
Tolerance for different moral 
standards Constant 6.94 *** (.97)
Attachment to Islam -.00 (.04)
Attachment to the nation .24 * (.11)
Adj R2 .05
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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supporters, while attachments to the 
nation have a negative influence, and 
generate reservations towards change. 
More analytically, a unit increase in 
Islamist attachments contributes a .15 
point increase in the opinion that modern 
values should coexist with tradition. The 
effect of Islamist attachments doubles to 
.27 points when predicting a preference 
for modernisation over tradition among 
CHP voters. This is evidence of the 
influence of the AKP’s modernisation 
agenda in the considerations of voters 
of the opposition party. Turning to the 
effect of nationalistic 
attachments, we see 
an even stronger 
negative impact of 
.35 points, indicating 
disapproval in 
emphasising modern 
values over tradition. 
This reservation is 
also expressed in 
the statement that “newer lifestyles 
contribute to the breakdown of society” 
where nationalism is a strong positive 
predictor with .58 points. Again we 
notice the difference in the salience of 
the effects of Islamic and nationalistic 
attachments. And although the effects 
of nationalism are stronger than those 
of Islamic attachments, we cannot say 
that modernisation considerations are 
monopolised by attachments to the 
nation. Both ideological considerations 
contribute to political preferences, 
Finally, we examined attitudes towards 
modernisation. As we noted earlier, a 
political debate that has been favourably 
addressed by Islamist and nationalistic 
agendas is the active engagement with 
Turkey’s modernisation. We expect 
that attachments to the nation and 
Islam both contribute to the support 
of modernisation, modern values and 
lifestyles. In Table 2 we saw that CHP 
voters do not support the statement that 
“lifestyles contribute to the breakdown 
of society”. Average response on this 
question was just 4.7 points on a 0 to 
10 scale. Agreement 
was high with the 
moderate statement 
that modern values 
should coexist with 
tradition (8.6 points) 
while agreement 
with more polarising 
statements such as 
“modern values should respect tradition” 
and “modern values are more important 
than tradition” received weaker support 
of around 6 points. These responses 
show that CHP supporters are in favour 
of moderate options when it comes to 
modernisation.
To identify the origins of their 
considerations we regressed attachments 
to Islam and the nation on opinions 
towards modernisation. The findings in 
Table 9 show that Islamist attachments 
have a positive influence on CHP 
Although the effects of 
nationalism are stronger than 
those of Islamic attachments, we 
cannot say that modernisation 
considerations are monopolised 
by attachments to the nation.
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of the interrelationship of the two 
ideologies, rather than the monopoly of 
one or the other in determining political 
preferences. 
one positively with mild effects and 
one negatively with stronger effects, 
interacting and calibrating political 
opinions. This is one more example 
in our survey in 2009. Our work follows 
from studies conducted in 2006 which 
for the first time identified evidence of 
ideological fluidity in Turkish public 
opinion in regards to Islamist and 
nationalistic attachments. We caution 
Conclusions and Discussion
In our study we measured the impact 
of Islamist and national attachments on 
a series of political attitudes related to 
traditional values as we captured them 
Table 9: Attitudes Towards Modernisation
CHP supporters
Emphasize modern values more than 
tradition Constant 7.66 *** (1.71)
Attachment to Islam .27 ** (.08)
Attachment to the nation -.35 (.19)
Adj R2 .19
N 67
Modern values coexist with tradition Constant 7.74 *** (1.34)
Attachment to Islam .15 * (.06)
Attachment to the nation .03 (.15)
Adj R2 .06
N 67
Newer lifestyles contribute to 
breakdown of society Constant -.56 (2.12)
Attachment to Islam .03 (.96)
Attachment to the nation .58 * (.23)
Adj R2 .06
N 67
Notes: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales. Parameter estimates are 
unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
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orientations, occupying significant space 
in the political considerations of CHP 
voters, either by moderating the effects 
of attachment to the nation, or at times 
defining these citizens’ preferences. 
Characteristically, we find that Islamist 
attachments have significant influence 
on attitudes towards religion, elements of 
national identity such as having Turkish 
ancestors and adopting Turkish customs, 
and attitudes towards modernisation 
such as emphasising modern values more 
than traditions. This is evidence of the 
shared influence of the two ideologies in 
shaping the opinions of those who vote 
for the CHP party. 
These pronounced effects of Islamist 
attachments on the opinions of CHP 
supporters demonstrate that in Turkey 
the two traditionally oppositional forces 
of Islamist and national attachments 
find the ground to exist at the individual 
level. We cannot assume the domination 
of one ideological space over the 
other; rather it becomes apparent that 
the common citizen perceives and 
internalises each of the two ideologies 
concurrently. Our study sheds light on 
this dynamic relationship by applying 
the reader that our sample is not 
representative of the Turkish population 
and we particularly oversampled CHP 
supporters living in Ankara. However, 
we think the significance of our findings 
lies in the identification of the processes 
by which citizens reach their judgements, 
rather than the representativeness of the 
judgements themselves for the whole 
population. 
Our analyses study the effects of 
attachments to the nation and Islam on 
CHP voters’ confidence towards political 
institutions. We find evidence that the 
old conflicts between Islamism and 
Kemalism still play an important role 
in Turkey. Some polarisation is present, 
manifested particularly in the “selective” 
confidence ratings we identified towards 
specific political institutions and 
actors. We also found that nationalistic 
attachments do not monopolise the 
considerations of CHP supporters 
when it comes to assigning confidence. 
For example, Islamist attachments were 
significant determinants of confidence 
towards the parliament among CHP 
supporters.
We also examined considerations 
regarding religiosity, national identity, 
tolerance, and modernisation. Again 
what is interesting is that we do not find 
attachments to the nation to be the sole 
determinant of the political opinions 
of CHP supporters. Instead, we see the 
influence of attachments to Islam as being 
a significant predictor of several political 
We expect that attachments 
to the nation and Islam both 
contribute to the support of 
modernisation, modern values 
and lifestyles. 
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here. It can be explored with longitudinal 
data measuring the political opinions of 
CHP voters, and modelling the effects of 
attachments to the nation and Islam over 
time as determinants of citizens’ political 
preferences. 
Our study provides a preliminary 
take in understanding these complex 
dynamics and explaining citizens’ political 
attitudes, and it opens further avenues 
of research in Turkish public opinion. 
The next step is to apply our model 
using nationally 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
samples of voters and 
also extending the 
analysis to examine 
the attitudes of 
AKP supporters. 
While the governing 
party has changed 
its formal position 
towards the EU and 
the country’s foreign relations, it would 
be interesting to study more extensively 
the expectations and determinants of 
the opinions of its voters. It is our hope 
that this research will stimulate scholars 
of Turkish public opinion to probe 
further for answers to these questions 
by investigating both quantitatively and 
qualitatively the structure of political 
responses at the individual level using 
tools that highlight the psychological 
mechanisms of political decision making. 
a systematic political psychological 
approach. By tracing the considerations 
that come to mind when citizens decide 
on political issues, we come closer to 
identifying how citizens internalise the 
ideological and political tensions in 
Turkey. To probe even deeper into the 
interconnectedness of the two political 
orientations, data collection can take the 
form of a qualitative study using in-depth 
interviews or focus groups of the target 
population. This will allow for more 
detailed and information-rich accounts 
of how citizens experience cognitively 
and affectively 
the tensions and 
interactions of the 
two ideologies. 
An additional 
extension of this 
work would be to 
examine changes 
over time in 
the ideological 
placement of the 
supporters of the conservative liberal 
democracy of the AKP and the social 
democracy of the CHP. As argued 
by Başlevent and his colleagues, 
the ideological orientations of AKP 
supporters and political Islam have been 
changing in line with the party’s liberal 
transformation towards a conservative 
democratic agenda. 38 We can hypothesise 
a similar process is taking place among 
CHP voters, preliminary evidence of 
which is evident in our study. This 
cannot be tested with the data available 
We cannot assume the 
domination of one ideological 
space over the other; rather 
it becomes apparent that the 
common citizen perceives and 
internalises each of the two 
ideologies concurrently.
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